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In the middle of his refutation of the Såµkhya philosophy which he presents in his 
BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya on sËtra 2.2.1, Ía∫kara attacks one aspect of his opponents' view in 
the following words:1 
 
tathå parimitånåµ bhedånåµ mËlå∫kuråd¥nåµ saµsargapËrvakatvaµ d®∑†vå 
båhyådhyåtmikånåµ bhedånåµ parimitatvåt saµsargapËrvakatvam anumimånasya 
sattvarajastamasåm api saµsargapËrvakatvaprasa∫ga˙, parimitatvåviße∑åt 
 
Deussen (1887: 318-319) translated this passage as follows: 
 
Ferner: wenn man aus der Wahrnehmung, dass die begrenzten Unterschiede, z.B. 
die Wurzel und die Pflanze, ein gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur 
Voraussetzung haben, daraus schliesst, dass die äusseren und inneren Unterschiede 
der Dinge, weil sie sich gegenseitig einschränken, ein gemeinschaftliches 
Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben (vgl. Sâñkhya-kârikâ 15), nun dann folgt, 
dass auch die drei Guˆa's Sattvam, Rajas und Tamas [nicht wie die Sâñkhya's 
meinen, die ursprünglichen Bestimmungen der Urmaterie sind, sondern] ein solches 
gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben, weil sie ebenso gut 
sich gegenseitig einschränken. 
 
This translation is problematic for various reasons. To begin with, it is not clear why things 
that limit each other (sich gegenseitig einschränken) should for that reason have been 
created together (gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein). Moreover, the Sanskrit term 
translated as gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein is saµsarga, which does not normally have 
that meaning according to the dictionaries. The translation Pflanze (‘plants’) for a∫kura, 
                                                
1 Perhaps because the Såµkhya argument and its rejection by Ía∫kara cover no more than a few lines, it does 
not figure in the summery of the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya by Karl H. Potter in the Encyclopedia of Indian 
Philosophies vol. III (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1981, p. 153). 
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finally, which really means ‘sprout’, is incorrect; we will see below that this is more than a 
minor point. 
 Other translators propose different interpretations. George Thibaut (1904: 366-367) 
translates: 
 
(Turning to the next Så∫khya argument which infers the existence of the pradhåna 
from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward 
and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are 
limited (a conclusion based on a the observation that some limited effects such as 
root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the 
conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhåna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and 
Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents; for they also 
are limited. 
 
Swami Gambhirananda (1972: 370) translates, similarly: 
 
Similarly if somebody infers that ‘since limited products like roots, sprouts, etc. are 
born out of a combination of many materials, therefore all external and corporeal 
modifications too must have been similarly formed out of the combination of many 
materials; for they too are limited’, then one will be faced with the predicament of 
sattva, rajas, and tamas also springing out of a combination of many materials, they 
too being equally limited. 
  
A.J. Alston, finally, translates (1989: 179): 
 
A further point is that if from observation of the fact that all limited effects involve 
a composite cause (saµsarga), as in the case of the seed and the sprout, one infers 
that the cause of the whole world and of external objects and mental phenomena 
(i.e. Nature and all its evolutes) must also be composite (composed of the three 
constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas), because it is also limited, then it would follow 
that the constituents sattva, rajas and tamas themselves must also have a composite 
cause, since they, too, are limited. 
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These translations are to be preferred to the one by Deussen. They agree, moreover, with 
some of the Sanskrit commentaries. Thibaut cites in a note (p. 367 n. 1) the following 
words from Ónandagiri's Nyåyanirˆaya (NyåNir, p. 416 l. 43): 
 
saµsargapËrvakatvaprasa∫ga iti guˆånåµ saµs®∑†ånekavastuprak®tikatvaprasaktir 
ity artha˙  
The expression saµsargapËrvakatvaprasa∫ga˙ means: the consequence that the 
[three] constituents (guˆa, i.e., sattva, rajas, and tamas) are[, each of them,] by 
nature composite and plural. 
 
Govindånanda's Bhå∑yaratnaprabhå states, similarly (BhRaPra, p. 416 l. 11):  
 
buddhyåd¥nåµ parimitatvena saµsargapËrvakatvasiddhau saµs®∑†åny anekåni 
sattvarajastamåµsi sidhyanti  
If it is established that [divisions] like the buddhi etc. are saµsargapËrvaka for being 
limited, then it is established that sattva, rajas and tamas are [each of them] 
composite and plural. 
 
And yet these interpretations are not fully satisfactory. They leave us with the question why 
roots and sprouts are given as examples of composite things,2 rather than whole plants or 
mountains, not to speak of the among Indian thinkers favourite chariots and houses. More 
problematic is that Ía∫kara's passage presents a Såµkhya argument in order to refute it; it is 
open to doubt whether the specific argument that appears in these translations has ever been 
used by the Såµkhyas. 
 
Deussen was no doubt right in drawing attention to Såµkhyakårikå 15, which enumerates a 
number of reasons from which the existence of the unmanifest (avyakta) can supposedly be 
deduced. The first of these two reasons are parimåˆa and samanvaya.3 As a matter of fact, 
the above passage in Ía∫kara's commentary occurs immediately after another one which 
deals with, and rejects, samanvaya as a factor from which the Såµkhya believes to be able 
to infer the existence of pradhåna as ultimate cause of the world. It seems therefore likely 
that Ía∫kara criticises here the arguments that are presented in that verse of the 
                                                
2 Alston, referring to Belvalkar, observes in a note: “Seed, soil, water, air, and light, etc., are involved”. 
3 SK 15-16: bhedånåµ parimåˆåt samanvayåt ... kåraˆam asty avyaktam ... 
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Såµkhyakårikå (which does not necessarily imply that he took them from the 
Såµkhyakårikå; see below). 
 Såµkhyakårikå 15 gives no explanation of what exactly is meant by parimåˆa in 
this context. Its commentaries do, but most of these explanations are so different from 
Ía∫kara's passage that little help in understanding our passage can be derived from them 
(see the appendix). Note however that the Yuktid¥pikå, which is known to sometimes 
preserve early interpretations,4 provides the following in its context incomprehensible 
enumeration (YD p. 141 l. 18-19): 
 
mËlå∫kuraparˆanåladaˆ∂abusatu∑aßËkapu∑pak∑¥rataˆ∂ulakaˆånåm  
of roots, sprouts, leaves, stalks, sticks, chaff, husk, awns, flowers, sap, rice-grains 
 
Whatever the reason why this enumeration is given,5 it is clear that it can be looked upon as 
an extension of Ía∫kara's mËlå∫kuråd¥nåµ. And it is also clear that all the items of the 
enumeration designate parts of plants, or of a plant. 
 More help may be derived from the commentary called Jayama∫galå of a certain 
Ía∫kara, who is different from the author of the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya. Here the words 
bhedånåµ parimåˆåt of kårikå 15 are explained as follows (JayMa∫, p. 80 l. 23-26): 
 
.../ bhidyanta iti bhedå˙, kåryaviße∑ås te∑åµ ekas saµsarg¥ d®∑†a˙ parimåˆåc ca/ 
bhedånåµ parimitatvåd ity artha˙/ yena ca parimitås te∑åm eka˙ saµsarg¥ d®∑†a˙/ 
yathå mËlå∫kurapatrakåˆ∂aprasavapu∑pa(tu)∑ataˆ∂ulakaˆånåµ bhedånåµ vr¥hi˙ ... 
Divisions (bheda) [are so called] because they are divided (bhidyante); [they are] 
special products. Of those [special products] it is observed that one thing combines 
them (saµsargin), because of their measure (parimåˆa). This means: because the 
divisions are limited (parimita). And that by which they are limited, [that] is the one 
thing that combines them; this much has been observed. An example is the rice 
plant [which is a combination] of roots, sprouts, leaves, stem, blossoms, flowers, 
husk and rice-grains. 
 
The explanation in the Jayama∫galå of the argument parimåˆåt is exceptional among the 
commentaries on the Såµkhya-kårikå, so much so that Solomon's study of these 
commentaries (1974: 39-40) does not even mention it. For our present purposes it is 
                                                
4 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1999a: 46 n. 113. 
5 The immediate context in the Yuktid¥pikå provides no clue; see the appendix below. 
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however important, for the author of the Jayama∫galå, like his namesake the author of the 
BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya and like the Yuktid¥pikå, gives an enumeration of the parts of a plant; 
moreover, the first two of these authors use the term saµsarga. This is not likely to be mere 
coincidence, and we are entitled to ask whether the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya borrowed from the 
Jayama∫galå or vice-versa, or whether perhaps both borrowed from an earlier text. 
 Unfortunately little is known about the date of the Jayama∫galå. The volume on 
Såµkhya of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies says the following about it (EIP IV p. 
272): “The date and authorship of Jayama∫galå is simply an open question, although 
Chakravarti's [(1951: 164-168)] claim that it precedes Våcaspati and comes after 
Yuktid¥pikå appears to be the most likely avenue for further research.” If Chakravarti's 
claim is correct, the author of the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya may not have borrowed from the 
Jayama∫galå. However, borrowing in the opposite direction is highly improbable, given 
that the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya presents the argument under consideration only in order to 
reject it. It seems much more likely that both these texts drew upon an earlier text that may 
no longer exist today. 
 About the earlier history of Såµkhya we owe a great deal to the work of Erich 
Frauwallner. His article “Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Såµkhya-Systems” (1958) in 
particular is of considerable importance. In this article Frauwallner draws attention to 
passages in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignåga's Pramåˆasamuccaya and in 
SiµhasËri's commentary on Mallavådin's Dvådaßåranayacakra which are cited or 
abbreviated from a Såµkhya work which no longer exists. This work may have been the 
›a∑†itantra of Vår∑agaˆya.6 For our present purposes it is particularly important that some 
of the passages from this text preserved in SiµhasËri's Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥ deal with proofs 
of the existence of pradhåna. Unfortunately SiµhasËri's presentation of the Såµkhya 
arguments is corrupt and condensed, sometimes beyond comprehension.7 It is however 
clear that there are five direct (v¥ta) proofs, which are dealt with in the following order: (i) 
bhedånåm anvayadarßanåt (NÓgAnu I, p. 314,7), (ii) bhedånåm parimåˆåt (NÓgAnu I, p. 
314,15), (iii) bhedånaµ kåryakåraˆabhåvåt (NÓgAnu I, p. 318,7), (iv) 
ßaktimadavasthåmåtratvåc chakt¥nåm (NÓgAnu I, p. 319, 7), (v) 
vaißvarËpyasyåvibhågapråpter deßakålapramåˆabalarËpapratyåsatter 
avaßyambhåvyucchedånucchedåbhyåµ ca niv®tte˙ (NÓgAnu I, p. 320,1-2). Såµkhyakårikå 
15 has what would seem to be the same enumeration, but in a different order: bhedånåµ 
                                                
6 On the name of this author, see Chakravarti, 1951: 135 ff.; Wezler, 1985: 14 n. 6. 
7 Frauwallner, 1958: 92-93 (231-232): “Der Text dieses ganzen Abschittes ist vielfach entstellt  und schwer 
verständlich. SiµhasËri hat nämlich stark gekürzt. Besonders die direkten und indirekten Beweisführungen 
sind teilweise bis zur Unkenntlichkeit Zusammengestrichen.” 
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parimåˆåt (= [ii]), samanvayåt (= [i]), ßaktita˙ prav®tteß ca (= [iv]), kåraˆakåryavibhågåt (= 
[iii]), avibhågåd vaißvarËpyasya (= [v]) [kåraˆam asty avyaktam 16a]. Ía∫kara’s 
commentary on BrahmasËtra 2.2.1 deals with the first three of these arguments in the 
following order: anvaya, parimåˆa, kåryakåraˆabhåva; argument (iv) is dealt with under 
BrahmasËtra 2.2.2. This is the order which we also find in SiµhasËri’s Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥, 
but not in the Såµkhyakårikå.8 It suggests that Ía∫kara followed the same text that is 
criticised by SiµhasËri and, presumably, Mallavådin, probably the ›a∑†itantra.9 
 This impression is confirmed by the presence, in SiµhasËri’s Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥, 
of the following specification of the proof bhedånåµ parimåˆåt (NÓgAnu I p. 318,4-6): 
 
tasmåt parimitatvåt saµsargapËrvakå bhedå˙, vr¥håv iva saµs®∑†å 
mËlå∫kuraparˆanålakåˆ∂aprasavatu∑aßËkapu∑pak∑¥rataˆ∂ulakaˆabhåvå˙, yathå vå 
ßukraßoˆitasaµs®∑†å˙ 
kalalårbudamåµsapeßißar¥ravyËhabålyakaumårayauvanasthåvirå bhåvå iti. 
Therefore, because they are limited (parimita), the divisions presuppose their 
combination (saµsarga), just like the states of root, sprout, leaf, stalk, stem, blossom, 
husk, awn, flower, sap and rice grain that are combined in a rice plant, or like the 
states of [embryonic] bodily disposition called kalala, arbuda, and måµsapeßi, as well 
as the states of infancy, childhood, youth and old age, which are combinations of 
sperm and blood. 
 
This passage is close both to what we find in the Jayama∫galå and to the position ascribed 
to his Såµkhya opponent by the author of the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya. It can therefore no 
longer be denied that Ía∫kara the author of the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, and the author of the 
Jayama∫galå, as well as the author of the Yuktid¥pikå to at least some extent, drew upon an 
earlier Såµkhya text, which may well have been the ›a∑†itantra of Vår∑agaˆya. It is now 
further possible to translate the passage from the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya cited above in the 
light of the passages from the Jayama∫galå and the Dvådaßåranayacakra, as follows:10 
                                                
8 One should not conclude from this that Ía∫kara did not know the Såµkhyakårikå. On BrahmasËtra 1.4.11, 
for example, he cites the whole of Såµkhyakårikå 3 (without mentioning the name “Såµkhyakårikå”). 
9 Note in this connection that Bhåskara’s commentary on BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya 2.2.1 attributes the following 
words to the Såµkyas, without specifying their source (BSËBhå/Bhå p. 109, 17-18): anvayåt parimåˆåc 
chaktita˙ prav®tteß ca / kåraˆakåryavibhågåd avibhågåd vaißvarËpyasya //. This quotation has the first two 
items in the order used by Ía∫kara, to be sure, but is otherwise so close to Såµkhyakårikå 15 that one is 
entitled to wonder whether it is an alternative version of that verse. It is clear from Bhåskara’s subsequent 
discussion that he did indeed read the first two items in this order. 
10 One is here reminded of Mahå-bh I p. 321 l. 2-3 (on P. 1.4.21): bahu∑u bahuvacanam ity ucyate/ ke∑u 
bahu∑u/ arthe∑u/ yady evaµ v®k∑a˙ plak∑a˙ atråpi pråpnoti/ bahavas te 'rthå mËlaµ skandha˙ phalaµ palåßam 
iti/ 
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tathå parimitånåµ bhedånåµ mËlå∫kuråd¥nåµ saµsargapËrvakatvaµ d®∑†vå 
båhyådhyåtmikånåµ bhedånåµ parimitatvåt saµsargapËrvakatvam anumimånasya 
sattvarajastamasåm api saµsargapËrvakatvaprasa∫ga˙, parimitatvåviße∑åt 
For someone who infers — having seen that divisions, such as roots, sprouts etc. 
(which are divisions of a plant), being limited, presuppose their combination 
(saµsarga) — that external and internal divisions, because they are limited, 
presuppose their combination, it would follow that sattva, rajas and tamas, too, 
presuppose their combination, for they are equally limited. 
 
* * * 
 
The different passages presented above present us with a Såµkhya doctrine in which 
pradhåna is apparently conceived of as the combination, perhaps we can say the totality, of 
all that exists. This is again confirmed in a passage of SiµhasËri's Nyåyågamanusåriˆ¥ 
which gives the following résumé of the five proofs (I p. 320 l. 7-8): tasmåd asti pradhånam 
iti ebhi˙ pañcabhir v¥tai˙ samanvaya-parimåˆa-upakåra-ßaktiprav®tti-
vaißvarËpyagatyåkhyai˙ såmånya-saµsarga-ekakart®-ßaktimacchakty-avibhågasaµjñaµ 
pradhånaµ siddham. This doctrine appears to have been held by Såµkhya thinkers at some 
time but has been all but lost in the surviving texts.11 According to this doctrine, the things 
that derive from pradhåna are its divisions. Ía∫kara's criticism of this position is not that 
sattva, rajas and tamas would be composite and plural, as several commentators have 
proposed, but the opposite: there would be no place for these three constituents in a single 
pradhåna. 
 It will be of interest to cite here another passage from Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra 
Bhå∑ya, this one on sËtra 2.1.29. Here too Ía∫kara criticises the Såµkhya: 
 
pradhånavådino 'pi hi niravayavam aparicchinnaµ ßabdådih¥naµ pradhånaµ 
såvayavasya paricchinnasya ßabdådimata˙ kåryasya kåraˆam iti svapak∑a˙/ 
The own position of the Såµkhya (pradhånavådin), too, is that pradhåna — which 
has no parts, is undivided and without [qualities] such as sound — is the cause of an 
                                                
11 The only modern full-length study dedicated to prak®ti (Jacobsen, 1999) is not aware of it either. Larson 
(1987: 69), on the other hand, observes: “Analytically, each manifest component is a ‘part’ of the ‘whole’ that 
is primordial materiality.” See further Bhåskara on BrahmasËtra 2.1.10: niravayavaµ ... pradhåna[m], and 
note 12 below.  
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effect which does have parts, which is divided and which does possess [qualities] 
such as sound. 
 
We know from Såµkhyakårikå 10 that the non-manifest (avyakta = pradhåna) is the 
opposite of the manifest (vyakta) and that the latter has parts (såvayava); this confirms that 
pradhåna has no parts. Ía∫kara's passage adds to this that pradhåna is undivided 
(aparicchinna), its effect divided (paricchinna). This strongly suggests, once again, that the 
creation of the world out of pradhåna consists in the division of pradhåna. 
 Consider now the following remark in the Yuktid¥pikå (YD p. 155 l. 17-18):12 
 
svakåryåd dhi prath¥yas¥ prak®tir bhavat¥ti ca na˙ samaya˙ 
For it is our doctrine that a prak®ti is larger than its effect. 
 
In the derivational scheme of things adhered to by Såµkhya all but the final evolutes are 
prak®tis. The present sentence states that each prak®ti is larger than its evolutes. Pradhåna, 
being the mËlaprak®ti, must as a result be larger than all its evolutes, and therefore 
presumably larger than all other existing things. Indeed, we also learn from Såµkhyakårikå 
10 that the non-manifest (which is pradhåna) is omnipresent (vyåpin).13 These statements fit 
in well with the idea that pradhåna is the totality of all there is, even though they do not 
prove it.  
 The associated idea that all that is limited in size is therefore non-original and 
therefore created finds expression in the following line of the Yuktid¥pikå (YD p. 155 l. 
32): 
 
iha yat paricchinnadeßaµ tat k®takaµ d®∑†aµ tad yathå gha†a˙ 
In this world it is observed that what occupies limited14 space has been 
made/created, as for example a jar. 
 
This observation, which is far from evident to impartial outsiders, clearly reflect a 
fundamental attitude of the Såµkhya school of philosophy, at least of the branch 
represented in the Yuktid¥pikå. 
                                                
12 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1999: 685 ff. 
13 Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya on sËtra 2.2.38, speaking of “Såµkhya with God”, confirms this: 
pradhånapuru∑eßvaråˆåµ sarvagatatvån niravayavatvåc ca.  
14 Note the use of paricchinna-, lit. “divided”. 
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 This same statement, in combination with the idea that pradhåna is the totality of all 
there is, suggests that each prak®ti is — or was at an earlier time, perhaps at the time of the 
›a∑†itantra — thought of as the combination of its evolutes. This in its turn would imply 
that the process of evolution out of pradhåna is — or was in the ›a∑†itantra — an ongoing 
division, in which the final evolutes are the final parts. This last conclusion finds an 
interesting confirmation in the writings of a number of classical authors, who ascribed a 
position to the Såµkhyas which is no longer part of its classical doctrine. According to 
these authors, Såµkhya held the opinion that material objects — and therefore the material 
elements themselves — are collections of qualities. Other texts teach us, moreover, that the 
qualities (sound, colour, etc.) were at one time thought of as the final evolutes.15 It goes 
without saying that the idea of qualities as final evolutes and at the same time as “parts” of 
elements fits in well with a vision of evolution as an ongoing division. 
 
 
Appendix: other explanations of parimåˆåt in SK 15 
 
As stated above, the commentaries on the Såµkhya Kårikå different from the Jayama∫galå 
do not offer any help in understanding Ía∫kara's statement in the BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya. The 
Yuktid¥pikå, usually the most detailed and in general most important surviving 
commentary, explains the words bhedånåµ parimåˆåt of the kårikå as follows (YD p. 141 l. 
18-21): 
 
yat parimitaµ tasya sata utpattir d®∑†å/ tad yathå mËlå∫kuraparˆanåladaˆ∂abusatu∑a-
ßËkapu∑pak∑¥rataˆ∂ulakaˆånåm/ parimitåß ca mahadahaµkårendriyatanmåtramahå-
bhËtalak∑aˆabhedå˙/ tasmåt satkåraˆapËrvakå˙/ yad e∑åµ kåraˆaµ tad avyaktam/ 
 
The problematic nature of the enumeration in the second sentence has already been 
commented upon above. If one insists on interpreting this enumeration in the context 
provided by the Yuktid¥pikå, all the parts of plants here enumerated must then illustrate the 
fact that limited things arise out of existing things, or out of an existing thing, which is 
strange. In the light of our preceding reflections we may now assume that this enumeration 
is what is left of an argument that has somehow disappeared in the Yuktid¥pikå but has 
                                                
15 See Bronkhorst, 1994: 311, with references to Aßvagho∑a's Buddhacarita, the Mahåbhårata, as well as to 
Strauss, 1913 and Frauwallner, 1927. A passage from the ›a∑†itantra regained by Steinkellner (1999: 670-71, 
675 (no. 8)) confirms the view that these qualities were thought of as evolutes: ßabdasparßarËparasagandhå˙ 
pañca trayåˆåµ sukhadu˙khamohånåµ sanniveßaviße∑å˙. 
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survived in the Jayama∫galå, in Ía∫kara's commentary on the BrahmasËtra, and of course 
in SiµhasËri's Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥. 
 The Må†harav®tti comments as follows (Må†hV®, p. 25-26): 
 
asti pradhånam/ kuta˙/ bhedånåµ parimåˆåt/ loke yatra kartåsti tasya 
parimåˆaµ d®∑†am/ yathå kulåla˙ parimitåt m®tpiˆ∂åt parimitam eva gha†aµ kurute 
prasthagråhakam å∂hakagråhakaµ vå/ evaµ vyaktaµ parimitam/ ekå buddhir eko 
'ha∫kåra˙ pañca tanmåtråˆi ekådaßendriyåˆi pañca mahåbhËtåni iti 
trayoviµßatikam/ evam etat parimitaµ vyaktaµ d®∑†vå 'numånena sådhayåmo 'sty 
asya kåraˆaµ pradhånaµ yad vyaktaµ parimitam utpådayati/ yadi ca pradhånaµ 
kåraˆaµ na syån ni∑parimåˆam idaµ vyaktaµ syåt/ asti cåsya parimåˆaµ tasmåd 
asti pradhånam/ 
 
The Gau∂apådabhå∑ya repeats this passage in almost exactly the same words, as do the 
Såµkhya-saptati-v®tti (V1) and the Såµkhya-v®tti (V2). The commentary preserved in 
Chinese translation and translated into French by J. Takakusu seems to have been close to 
the above (Takakusu, 1904: 999): 
 
‘Parce que les classes spécifiques sont finies.’ Dans ce monde une chose produite a 
une mesure, une dimension, un nombre; ainsi avec une quantité d'argile donnée, le 
potier frabique des vases, d'un nombre limité. Supprimez la matière originelle 
(argile), et il n'y aura plus de mesure numérique ni de vase. Voyant que les vases ont 
une mesure numérique, nous savons qu'ils ont une matière originelle. La 
comparaison des fils constituant un vêtement est également applicable. Parmi les 
(vingt-cinq) principes, les principes évolués, le Mahat et les autres, possèdent 
également une mesure numérique. Quelle est cette mesure numérique? Le Mahat est 
un, le Sentiment du moi est un, les éléments subtils sont cinq, les organes sont onze 
et les grands éléments sont cinq. Quant à ces principes évolués, nous voyons qu'ils 
ont une mesure numérique. En raisonnant par analogie, nous savons qu'il y a une 
Nature (origine). S'il n'y avait pas une Nature, les principes évolués n'auraient pas 
de mesure numérique et ces principes eux-mêmes n'existeraient pas. 
 
The Tattvakaumud¥ of Våcaspati Mißra has, in Ganganatha Jha's edition (important variants 
in Srinivasan's edition): 
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parimåˆåt iti/ parimitatvåt, avyåpitvåd iti yåvat/ vivådådhyåsitå mahadådibhedå 
avyaktakåraˆavanta˙, parimitatvåt, gha†ådivat/ gha†ådayo hi parimitå˙ 
m®dådyavyaktakåraˆakå d®∑†å˙/ 
 
The Candrikå of Nåråyaˆa T¥rtha explains: 
 
parimåˆåt parimitatvåd avyåpitvåt, anekatvarËpabhedavattvåd vå, yad yad anekam 
avyåpi ca tat tat kåryam, bhavati ca mahadådikaµ pratipuru∑aniyatatvåd anekam 
avyåpi ca, atas tatkåraˆaµ yogyatayå nityam ekaµ pradhånam eveti bhåva˙/ 
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